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Do electric vehicles need subsidies in the UK? 
 
Abstract 
We analyse the total cost of ownership of petrol, diesel, hybrid electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid 
electric vehicles and battery electric vehicles in the UK over 2017-2029. We do this for large, 
medium and small cars, under assumptions of 0%, 6%, 30% and 60% discount rates. We find 
that some electric car models from mass market brands are close to reaching cost parity with 
their petrol, diesel and hybrid counterparts, but subsidies would accelerate their uptake, 
especially for impatient consumers with high discount rates. Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles are 
not worth the effort because although relatively low, their CO2 emissions are non-zero. A 
subsidy of £4,500 or an exemption from the 20% VAT, perhaps capped at £4,500, would 
accelerate mass market penetration of battery electric vehicles in the UK. If decarbonising road 
transport were not as urgent as it is, the market for battery electric vehicles could be left to 
develop on its own, without government intervention. However, because the cost of batteries is 
not falling fast enough, subsidies are needed in the short term. 
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1. Introduction 
 
In 2017, the transport sector was responsible for 27% of total GHG emissions in Europe, two 
thirds of which were generated by road transport (European Environment Agency, 2019). The 
Paris Agreement, which came into effect in November 2016, commits developed and 
developing countries to keeping global warming below 2°C and aspiring to a target of 1.5°C. 
 
In June 2019, the UK became the first major economy in the world to pass net zero emissions 
legislation (UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2020). The target 
requires the UK to bring all GHG emissions to net zero by 2050. Since decarbonising aviation 
and shipping by 2050 would be very challenging, cars and vans will need to be completely 
decarbonised (Transport and the Environment, 2018, p. 8). Decarbonisation of cars and vans 
cannot be achieved by improving the efficiency of internal combustion engines or replacing 
petrol and diesel with advanced biofuels or synthetic fuels (Transport and the Environment, 
2018, p. 8). 
 
In July 2017, the British government announced that it would “end the sale of all new 
conventional petrol and diesel cars and vans by 2040” (UK Department for Environment, Food 
& Rural Affairs and Department for Transport, 2017, p. 1, point 6). In May 2019, the UK 
Committee on Climate Change stated that 2040 was too late to phase out petrol and diesel cars 
and vans and recommended all sales to be pure battery electric by 2035 at the latest (UK 
Committee on Climate Change, 2019). Following this, in February 2020, the government 
opened a public consultation on moving the deadline forward and ending the sale of new petrol, 
diesel and hybrid cars and vans by 2035 or earlier (UK Department for Transport and Office 
for Low Emission Vehicles, 2020a). However, there is no clear plan on how to achieve the 2040 
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target, let alone the 2035 one, except for ‘The Road to Zero: Next steps towards cleaner road 
transport and delivering our Industrial Strategy’ (UK Department for Transport, 2018a), which 
lists a number of policies in very broad terms, including regulation, affordability and consumer 
information. The document, published in July 2018, claimed that the government would 
“continue to bring down the cost of purchasing and owning ultra-low emission vehicles through 
grants and other incentives” (UK Department for Transport, 2018a, p. 42), but in October that 
same year the grants were reduced (UK Office for Low Emission Vehicles, 2018b). 
 
Battery electric vehicles, which as discussed below, are seen as the way forward, have a higher 
purchase price than conventional vehicles, due to the cost of the battery. This has been a 
significant hurdle limiting consumer’s uptake of electric vehicles (International Energy 
Agency, 2018, p. 68; Gómez Vilchez et al., 2019). Thanks to the effects of learning and 
economies of scale, battery costs declined by approximately 14% per year between 2007 and 
2014, from above US$1,000 per kWh to around US$410 per kWh (Nykvist and Nilsson, 2015). 
In the year 2017 the costs varied between US$360 per kWh to US$155 per kWh and the cost 
forecast for 2030 is US$100 per kWh to US$122 per kWh (International Energy Agency, 2018, 
pp. 66-67). The reduction in battery costs has helped reduce the initial price tag of electric 
vehicles somewhat. 
 
Given the commitments made in the Paris Agreement and the UK government announcement 
to end the sale of all new conventional cars and vans by 2040 (or, pending the results of the 
2020 consultation, by 2035), it is surprising that little attention has been devoted to putting 
together a policy package to ensure consumers in large numbers will be willing (which in 
economics also means “able to afford”) to buy clean vehicles. Even the UK Committee on 
Climate Change (2019, p. 11), describes the plans for delivering the 2040 target as “too vague.” 
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Against this backdrop, it is important to understand whether electric vehicles need subsidies in 
the UK and if so, of how much. 
 
We address this question by comparing the total costs of ownership (TCO) of petrol, diesel, 
hybrid electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and battery electric vehicles bought in 
the UK in 2017. We do this for three different car sizes: large, medium and small. For each car 
size and propulsion type we use the model with the highest number of registrations in 2017. We 
find that the lower operating costs of plug-in hybrid and battery electric vehicles do not 
completely offset their higher purchase price for the car models selected. We then extend the 
analysis in Appendix B to include lower priced electric vehicles, and find that although some 
have virtually reached or are close to reaching cost parity, subsidies would accelerate their 
market penetration. Plug-in hybrid electric vehicles may be not worth the effort, however, 
because although they cause substantially lower CO2 emissions, they still cause some, and their 
purchase price is as high or even higher than that of battery electric vehicles. 
 
One important methodological contribution of the present study is that, unlike most previous 
TCO calculations, it excludes all current taxes and subsidies to start with. This is important 
because taxes and subsidies distort relative prices, regardless of whether changing relative 
prices was the objective of the government or not. What matters for policy is how the TCO of 
cleaner technologies compares with the TCO of conventional ones, and whether lower 
operating costs compensate for a higher initial purchase price. It is only on the basis of net TCO 
that a sensible policy package can be put together. After computing the TCO exclusive of taxes 
and subsidies, current taxes and subsidies are added on to the calculation, to understand whether 
the current package is helping to narrow or eliminate the gap, which it is. This result, however, 
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is very sensitive to the initial purchase price. The higher the initial price, the higher the subsidy 
needed to close the TCO gap. 
 
In addition to the above, the study makes two important contributions on the policy front: first, 
it compares the TCO of small, medium and large cars on different propulsion systems in the 
UK, and, second, it highlights the importance of subsidies in relation to the initial purchase 
price. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 critically reviews previous work. Section 3 describes 
the model and the data. Section 4 presents the results, and Section 5 concludes and provides 
some policy recommendations. In addition, the paper has three appendices: Appendix A lists 
the car manufacturers’ websites; Appendix B contains an extensive sensitivity analysis and an 
extended analysis to include six additional car models, and Appendix C contains a comparison 
of the specific car models used in this study. 
 
2. Previous work 
 
Decarbonising the road transport sector will require mass penetration of alternative 
technologies, and electric vehicles (EVs) are seen as a very promising option (Diao et al., 2016; 
Hagman et al., 2016; Andwari et al., 2017; Hardman et el., 2017; Hao et al., 2017; Wang et al., 
2017; Cavallaro et al., 2018; Gómez Vilchez et al., 2019; He et al., 2019; Li et al., 2020). 
However, the price of EVs is high relative to that of conventional petrol and diesel cars. Their 
running costs, however, are lower. 
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In 2017, 2018, and 2019, 1.7%, 2.1%, and 2.7% of newly registered vehicles in the UK were 
either plug-in hybrid or battery electric (UK Department for Transport, 2018c, 2019a, 2020a). 
Although there is an increasing trend, the numbers are still low. The UK is not the only country 
with such a low share and the literature has devoted some attention to potential reasons, such 
as consumers being sceptical about unfamiliar technologies (Carley et al., 2013) or anxious 
about battery range and charging infrastructure (Sierzchula et al., 2014; Lieven, 2015; Bonges 
III and Lusk, 2016; Mersky et al., 2016; Egbue et al., 2017; Liao et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017). 
Policy can certainly help in those areas (Liao et al., 2017; Santos and Davies, 2020) and there 
is evidence that it does (Mersky et al., 2016; Rietmann and Lieven, 2019). 
 
Another important possible reason that has also been considered extensively in the literature is 
that consumers may simply be failing to take operating costs into account altogether. In fact, 
this issue has been examined for a number of years, not just in relation to EVs but, going further 
back in time, in relation to vehicles with higher fuel efficiency, and also in relation to appliances 
more generally, and their energy consumption, with Hausman (1979) starting this tradition. 
Turrentine and Kurani (2007), Sovacool and Hirsh (2009) and Allcott (2011), for example, 
argue that consumers do not analyse their fuel costs in a systematic way in their vehicle 
purchases. For those who do, not much is known about how they estimate the value of improved 
fuel economy and factor it in their purchasing decisions (Greene et al., 2005, p. 758; Greene, 
2010, p. vi). 
 
The sticky issue on which there is much controversy is the implicit discount rate. Gallagher and 
Muehlegger (2011) compare consumer response to changes in petrol prices and upfront 
payments, in the form of sales tax waivers, and estimate an implicit discount rate of 14.6%, 
whilst Busse et al. (2013) analyse the effect of petrol prices on short-run equilibrium prices of 
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cars of different fuel economies and find implicit discount rates under 10%, with some being 
very small or even negative (!), meaning that future fuel costs are not discounted but 
compounded. This great variation in estimated implicit discount rates is further evidenced by 
Greene (2010), who reviews 27 econometric studies that directly or indirectly estimate the value 
consumers place on fuel economy. The implicit discount rates from those 27 studies vary from 
0.2% to over 60% (Greene, 2010, p. xi). The two most important conclusions from Greene 
(2010) are that (a) some consumers significantly undervalue future fuel savings, some fully 
value future fuel savings, and some significantly overvalue future fuel savings; and (b) the 
literature has consistently yielded widely varying estimates of discount rates over a period of 
more than three decades, and this suggests that there is “either an empirical problem in 
estimating the value consumers place on fuel economy, or that the presumed theory of consumer 
behaviour is incorrect, or both” (Greene, 2010, p. vii). 
 
Although Busse et al. (2013) conclude that there is little evidence that consumers are myopic, 
in a recent and more comprehensive review of the reasons for the (somewhat disappointing) 
adoption of energy-efficient technologies by individuals and firms, Gerarden et al. (2017) find 
evidence of inattention and/or myopia. On similar lines, Leard (2018) highlights the issue of 
inattention, and finds that inattentive consumers make choices as if they undervalued fuel cost 
savings, or simply as if they did not pay attention to fuel costs, and attentive consumers make 
choices as if they fully valued these savings. Unsurprisingly, those consumers who do not drive 
much are less likely to pay attention to fuel costs (Leard, 2018). This is in line with results by 
Santos and Davies (2020), who find that fleet operators are more attentive than other drivers to 
fuel costs (and taxes), probably because their businesses revolve around driving long distances. 
The problem of consumers not realising that in the long run the savings in operating costs may 
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offset at least part of the initial price could potentially be solved by supplying them with 
information on the TCO in promotional materials or car labels (Dumortier et al., 2015). 
 
The question, however, is, even if all consumers behaved rationally and discounted operating 
costs at the time of choosing a car to purchase, or were provided with information on the TCO, 
and even if there were consistency across the literature regarding implicit discount rates, do the 
lower operating costs of EVs compensate their higher purchase price, within a reasonable period 
of time? This is by far the most pressing issue at the moment, evidenced by the increasing 
number of studies, namely under the umbrella of TCO, trying to answer exactly that very 
question. 
 
Liu and Santos (2015), for example, compare TCO for cars on different propulsion systems in 
the US and conclude that cleaner technologies are more expensive than conventional ones, a 
result that also holds after taking into account the climate change costs of CO2 emissions. Using 
much more detailed data, Breetz and Salon (2018) analyse the five-year TCO for conventional, 
hybrid, and electric vehicles in 14 U.S. cities from 2011 to 2015 and find that the lower 
operating costs of battery electric vehicles are not enough to make up for their high purchase 
price and conclude that subsidies are needed. Their careful study is city-specific, as incentives 
vary across cities in the US. 
 
Zhao et al. (2015) compute TCO and conclude that battery electric vehicles are not competitive 
with conventional vehicles in China even after taking the central government subsidies into 
account. Diao et al. (2016) also highlight the importance of subsidies to battery electric vehicles 
in China. The TCO they compute are higher for battery electric vehicles than for conventional 
ones, even though they include the (monetised) benefits that battery electric vehicles enjoy in 
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the form of exemptions from license plate and driving restrictions.1 Hao et al. (2017) also find 
that for the Chinese case, TCO are higher for battery electric vehicles and emphasise the 
important role of policy, including subsidies. 
 
Palmer et al. (2018) calculate TCO for conventional, hybrid, plug-in hybrid and battery electric 
vehicles in the UK, in California and Texas for the US, and in Japan, for the time period 1997-
2015, and find that subsidies are indeed important, and have allowed battery electric vehicles 
to reach cost parity in the UK, California and Texas, but this is not the case for plug-in hybrid 
electric vehicles, which were subsidised in the past but are not any longer. 
 
On the same lines, Bubeck et al. (2016) model TCO for Germany, and conclude that plug-in 
hybrid electric vehicles and battery electric vehicles are not competitive and need substantial 
subsidies from the government. Danielis et al. (2018) and Scorrano et al. (2020) also estimate 
TCO, but for Italy, and find that battery electric cars are not cost-competitive with petrol or 
diesel cars. However, when subsidies are included in the calculations, battery electric cars break 
even with some diesel cars. Weldon et al. (2018) reach a similar conclusion for Ireland, when 
comparing TCO of battery electric cars and internal combustion engine ones. Hagman et al. 
(2016) conduct a similar exercise for Sweden and also find that government subsidies are 
pivotal in making battery electric vehicles competitive with internal combustion engine and 
hybrid ones. 
 
 
1 Vehicle purchase restrictions are essentially a cap on the total number of vehicles that can be sold in a 
year, and driving restrictions are bans from circulation in urban areas imposed on certain number plates 
on some days. These policies are in place in a number of Chinese cities. 
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In a more sophisticated study, Lévay et al. (2017) estimate TCO for a number of electric 
vehicle-internal combustion engine vehicle pairs to make cross-segment and cross-country 
comparisons in France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, and the United 
Kingdom. They find that subsidies and/or tax breaks are essential in making electric vehicles 
competitive with internal combustion engine ones, and although they do not have enough 
observations to conduct a statistical analysis, their descriptive analysis shows that there is an 
association between fiscal incentives and electric vehicle market share. 
 
The present study applies this well-known TCO technique to the UK case, but as explained in 
Section 1, it differs from previous studies in that it excludes all current taxes and subsidies in 
the baseline calculations, it compares the TCO of small, medium and large cars running on 
different propulsion systems, and then assesses the impact of current taxes and subsidies on 
closing the gap in TCO, which is important to accelerate EV market penetration. 
 
3. Model and data 
 
This section details the model that we used, the vehicles that we chose to compare and why, 
and the data sources. 
 
3.1 Total costs of ownership 
 
We calculate the Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) for a car bought in 2017 with the following 
standard formula: 
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𝑇𝐶𝑂 = ∑
𝐶𝑡
(1 + 𝑟)𝑡
𝑡=12
𝑡=0
 
 
where C is cost and includes the vehicle purchase price, fuel and electricity costs and non-fuel 
operating costs in the baseline calculations, minus purchase subsidies plus energy and vehicle 
taxes in an extended model, plus the cost of CO2 emissions in a further extension; t indicates 
the year and varies from year 0 (2017) to year 12 (2029), and r is the discount rate, for which 
we assume four different values (0%, 6%, 30% and 60%). The rationale for choosing these 
values is that they span the range found in previous work (Greene, 2010, p. xi), as discussed in 
Section 2. All monetary values are expressed in 2017 prices.2 
 
The reason for modelling up to the year 2029 was that we assumed that the lifetime mileage of 
a battery electric vehicle, defined as the total distance a car is driven during its entire life, was 
100,000 miles (or 161,000 kilometres), which considering the annual distances driven, as 
described below, would make 2029 the year when the car would need to be scrapped/replaced. 
The assumption of 100,000 miles (or 161,000 kilometres) is in line with the literature. The 
International Energy Agency (2018, p. 62) estimates battery life at around 175,000 km. 
Newbery and Strbac (2016, p.3) assume EV battery life as 170,000 km. Also, many of the 
manufacturers’ warranties on batteries are fixed for 100,000 miles or 161,000 kilometres 
(Safari, 2018, p. 56; Wu et al., 2015, p. 200). 
 
For modelling purposes, the average distance travelled by cars in the UK for 2017, 7,800 miles 
(or 12,553 km) per car per year, was taken from Table NTS0901 from the National Travel 
 
2 All relevant conversions were made using the GDP deflator from the UK Office for National Statistics 
(2020). 
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Survey (NTS), published by the UK Department for Transport (2018d). This average distance 
is set to both decrease, due to an increase in the prices of energy (petrol, diesel and electricity), 
and increase, due to an increase in income per capita. The net increase will depend on both price 
and income elasticities, as shown in Table 1 and discussed further down. 
 
Income, fuel and electricity price projections were taken from UK government publications, as 
detailed below. The elasticities of distance travelled with respect to energy prices and with 
respect to income were used in order to estimate how annual distance travelled will evolve over 
the years. The elasticity of distance travelled with respect to energy prices was assumed to be -
0.10 and the elasticity of distance travelled with respect to income was assumed to be 0.005. 
The values were taken from Goodwin et al. (2004), Tables 3 (p. 282) and 5 (p. 284), 
respectively.3 Table 3 in Goodwin et al. (2004) reports fuel price elasticities rather than 
electricity price elasticities, so for this reason, we conducted a sensitivity test by doubling and 
halving both the elasticity of distance travelled with respect to energy prices and the income 
elasticity, and these changes made virtually no difference. Although our benchmark model 
excludes all taxes, we projected distance driven over the period by applying elasticities to fuel 
and electricity prices with and without taxes, to test for sensitivity. In all six cases cars reach 
about 100,000 miles in 2029, as Table 1 shows. 
  
 
3 The central value of the income elasticity on Table 5 (p. 284) in Goodwin et al. (2004) is actually 
negative and counter-intuitive, so the highest possible value reported there was used instead. 
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Table 1: Total distance driven in miles per vehicle in the UK 2017-2029 (projected) 
 
Total distance driven 
 
Central elasticities Doubled elasticities Halved elasticities 
Without taxes 100,346 99,308 100,871 
With taxes 100,553 99,716 100,975 
Source: own calculations 
 
Income projections for the period 2017 to 2029 were taken from the Annual Parameters Table 
of the WebTAG Data Book (UK Department for Transport, 2018e). 
 
The costs included in C are purchase price, fuel/electricity costs, and non-fuel operating costs. 
 
In contrast with the United States, where costs vary by state and even city, in the UK, costs are 
the same throughout the country, as are all taxes and subsidies on vehicles and energy. Also, 
unlike China, the UK does not have any vehicle purchase restrictions or driving restrictions in 
place,4  which Diao et al. (2016) monetise and include in their TCO calculations. 
 
The congestion charge in London, from which plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and battery 
electric vehicles are exempt, can be ignored in the TCO calculations for two reasons: (a) the 
exemptions for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and battery electric vehicles are set to be 
 
4 Many towns and cities in the UK are considering clean air zones but none have been implemented at 
the time of writing this paper, except for the London Ultra Low Emission Zone, which only affects 
petrol cars that do not meet the Euro 4 standard, which became mandatory in 2005, and diesel cars that 
do not meet the Euro 6 standard, which became mandatory in September 2015. 
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terminated in 2021 and 2025, respectively (Transport for London, 2020); and (b) only 0.27% 
of all cars registered in the UK use the congestion charging zone in London.5 
 
Finally, there are only a very small number of embryonic schemes in some English towns and 
cities, and boroughs in London, offering free parking to electric vehicles. We cannot add these 
to the TCO because such schemes are very few, very small, and there are no data on uptake or 
savings. 
 
To summarise, the costs included in C and discussed below are purchase price, fuel/electricity 
costs, and non-fuel operating costs. There are clear guidelines from the government on 
depreciation costs for conventional and electric vehicles, which are embedded in the non-fuel 
operating costs, as explained in Section 3.1.3. 
 
3.1.1 Purchase price 
 
The purchase price for each of the vehicles we modelled was taken from the manufacturers’ 
websites. The prices are detailed in Table 4 and the manufacturers’ websites are listed in 
Appendix A. 
 
3.1.2 Fuel/energy costs 
 
 
5 This was computed as 85,854, the total number of cars using the charging zone daily in September 
2019 (Transport for London, 2019, p. 184, Table 10.6), divided by 31.89 million, the total number of 
cars (of all ages) registered in the UK in 2019 (UK Department for Transport, 2020b, Table VEH0207). 
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The fuel and domestic electricity prices for the period 2017-2029 were taken from Table A 
1.3.7 of the WebTAG Data Book (UK Department for Transport, 2018e). These are 
disaggregated by net price, duty and VAT, and correspond to UK government forecasts. 
Commercial electricity prices were taken from Table 4 of the set of tables supporting the 
Treasury Green Book Supplementary Appraisal Guidance on Valuing Energy Use and GHG 
Emissions (UK Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2017). Commercial 
electricity prices are not subject to VAT but are subject to the Climate Change Levy, which is 
a tax on energy delivered to non-domestic users, with the aim of providing an incentive to 
increase energy efficiency and reduce CO2 emissions. The Climate Change Levy was removed 
from commercial electricity prices. The Climate Change Levy for 2017, 2018 and 2019 is 
available from HM Revenues & Customs (2016). Since the UK government does not provide 
any projections for the Climate Change Levy, the 2019 levy was removed from commercial 
electricity prices for the remaining of the period modelled. 
 
Both commercial and domestic (also known as residential) electricity prices were used because 
drivers may charge their batteries at home or in a charging station provided by the employer or 
a charging point in a service station or on the road. Following Liu and Santos (2015), we 
assumed that 2/3 of charging was done at home and 1/3 of charging was done at work or at 
commercial stations, but we also tested for sensitivity with respect to this assumption, by re-
estimating the results assuming (a) all charging was done at home, and (b) all charging was 
done at work or commercial stations. The results are virtually the same under any of the 
assumptions, showing the model is not sensitive to where the batteries are charged, i.e., to 
domestic versus commercial electricity prices. The results of this sensitivity analysis are 
presented in Appendix B. 
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Figures 1 and 2 show fuel and electricity prices, all of which are forecast to increase in real 
terms over the period modelled. 
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Figure 1: Petrol and diesel prices 2017-2029, excluding all taxes 
 
Source: UK Department for Transport, 2018e, Table A 1.3.7 
 
Figure 2: Commercial and domestic electricity prices 2017-2029, excluding all taxes 
 
Source: UK Department for Transport, 2018e, Table A 1.3.7 (domestic prices) and UK 
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2017, Table 4 (commercial prices) 
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3.1.3 Non-fuel operating costs 
 
In line with the UK Department for Transport (2018e), non-fuel operating costs were assumed 
to include oil, tyres, maintenance, depreciation and vehicle capital saving (only for vehicles in 
working time). We also used the formula proposed by the UK Department for Transport 
(2018e), as follows: 
 
𝐶 = 𝑎 + 𝑏/𝑉 
 
where C is cost in pence per km, V is average speed in km per hour, a is a parameter for distance 
related costs, and b is a parameter for vehicle capital saving (only relevant to working vehicles). 
 
The a and b parameters for the period in question were taken from Tables A 1.3.14 and A 1.3.15 
of the WebTAG Data Book (UK Department for Transport, 2018e). We also assumed that the 
proportion of car travel in working time was 12% and the proportion of car travel in non-
working time was 88%, in line with Table A 1.3.4 of the WebTAG Data Book (UK Department 
for Transport, 2018e). 
 
The average speed was estimated as a weighted average of speeds by type of road, taken from 
Table SPE0112 of speed statistics (UK Department for Transport, 2018f). The share of traffic 
by road was taken from Table TRA0104 of road traffic statistics (UK Department for Transport, 
2018g) and was assumed to be constant throughout the period. We conducted sensitivity tests 
but the results stay virtually the same when the speed is doubled or halved, as shown in 
Appendix B. 
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Table A 1.3.15 of the WebTAG Data Book (UK Department for Transport, 2018e) provides a 
forecast trend of non-fuel costs for petrol and diesel cars but no such forecast for electric cars. 
Because of this, we used the base value for 2017 for electric cars, calculated using the 
parameters from Table A 1.3.14, and then created a series by applying the same annual change 
of the forecast for petrol and diesel car non-fuel costs. 
 
Non-fuel operating costs for hybrid electric vehicles (HEVs) were assumed to be the same as 
those for petrol and diesel because they produce electricity whilst running on petrol and diesel. 
Non-fuel operating costs for plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) were assumed to be an 
average of non-fuel operating costs for conventional cars and non-fuel operating costs for 
battery electric vehicles (BEVs) because PHEVs have a dual powertrain. 
 
Figure 3 shows non-fuel operating costs for the cars modelled over 2017-2029. 
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Figure 3: Non-fuel operating costs 
 
Source: estimated by the authors, as explained in the text, using data from the UK Department 
for Transport, 2018e (Tables A 1.3.14, A 1.3.15 and Table A 1.3.4), UK Department for 
Transport, 2018f (Table SPE0112) and UK Department for Transport, 2018g (Table TRA0104) 
 
3.1.4 Taxes and subsidies 
 
All taxes and subsidies were excluded from our baseline calculations and only included at a 
later stage to check whether they help and whether any changes are needed. 
 
As explained in Section 3.1.2, petrol and diesel taxes and domestic electricity taxes for the 
period 2017-2029 were taken from Table A 1.3.7 of the WebTAG Data Book (UK Department 
for Transport, 2018e), and the Climate Change Levy, from HM Revenues & Customs (2016), 
which only contains the levy up to 2019. Since the UK government has not published its 
planned Climate Change Levy up to 2029, the 2019 amount was assumed for 2020-2029. Table 
2 presents all petrol, diesel and electricity taxes. 
0
1
2
3
4
5
R
ea
l 2
0
1
7
 p
en
ce
 p
er
 k
m
Year
BEVs PHEVs Petrol/Diesel/HEVs
21 
 
Table 2: Petrol, diesel and electricity taxes, in 2017 prices 
Year 
 
 
Petrol and 
diesel duty 
Petrol and 
diesel 
VAT 
Domestic 
electricity 
duty 
Commercial 
electricity 
duty 
Domestic 
electricity 
VAT 
Commercial 
electricity 
VAT 
Domestic 
electricity 
CCL 
Commercial 
electricity 
CCL 
 
(pence/litre) % (pence/kWh) (pence/kWh) % % (pence/kWh) (pence/kWh) 
2017 58.15 20 0 0 5 0 0 0.568 
2018 58.73 20 0 0 5 0 0 0.583 
2019 59.84 20 0 0 5 0 0 0.847 
2020 60.68 20 0 0 5 0 0 0.847 
2021 61.38 20 0 0 5 0 0 0.847 
2022 62.17 20 0 0 5 0 0 0.847 
2023 62.75 20 0 0 5 0 0 0.847 
2024 63.35 20 0 0 5 0 0 0.847 
2025 63.96 20 0 0 5 0 0 0.847 
2026 64.57 20 0 0 5 0 0 0.847 
2027 65.19 20 0 0 5 0 0 0.847 
2028 65.82 20 0 0 5 0 0 0.847 
2029 66.46 20 0 0 5 0 0 0.847 
Source: UK Department for Transport (2018e, Table A 1.3.7) and HM Revenues & Customs (2016) 
 
 
1 
 
Purchase subsidies for PHEVs and BEVs in 2017, known as plug-in grants, were taken from 
the UK Office for Low Emission Vehicles (2016, p.1). These government grants were based on 
the environmental performance of the vehicle, defined as CO2 emissions and their zero 
emission range. These grants, however, were reduced in October 2018, and then again, in March 
2020, as shown on Table 3. In March 2020 zero emission cars priced over £50,000 ceased to 
be eligible to receive a grant. 
 
The Vehicle Excise Duty (VED) is “a tax applicable to all vehicles driving on UK roads” (UK 
Office for Low Emission Vehicles, 2018a, p. 2). The VED depends on the car CO2 emissions 
and varies between the first and subsequent years. In addition, diesel vehicles, which cause 
substantially more air pollution than all other powertrains, pay a higher rate. The VED rates for 
each of the cars modelled in this study are presented on Table 4. 
 
All cars with a list price above £40,000 are also levied a supplement of £310 in addition to the 
standard VED rate for the first five years in which the standard rate is paid (UK Office for Low 
Emission Vehicles, 2018a, point 2.5 and Table 4). The 2020 Budget, however, introduced an 
exemption from the supplement for new and existing zero emission cars (HM Treasury, 2020, 
point 1.245, p. 63). This means that the Tesla X modelled in the present study, which paid the 
supplement in 2018 and 2019, will not pay the supplement in 2020, 2021 or 2022. 
 
3.1.5 Cost of CO2 emissions 
 
The cost of CO2 emissions for each vehicle modelled was simply estimated as the quantity of 
CO2 emitted multiplied by the central value of the non-traded price of CO2, which was taken 
from Table A 3.4 of the WebTAG Data Book (UK Department for Transport, 2018e). The 
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higher values of the non-traded price of CO2 were used for the sensitivity analysis presented in 
Appendix B, as was the double of these higher values. 
 
We should highlight, however, that the debate over the Social Cost of Carbon, which is based 
on a valuation of the damages associated with climate change, is far from settled in academic 
and policy-making circles. Social Cost of Carbon estimates span a very wide range, depending 
on the model used and the assumptions made. It has been estimated hundreds of times since the 
early 1990s, with estimates varying from US$10 per tCO2 to US$1,000 per tCO2 (Ricke et al., 
2018). Following a comprehensive review in 2009, the UK government adopted an approach 
that moved away from the Social Cost of Carbon (Santos, 2017a, p. 123). Instead, the values 
are now based on the UK government reduction targets and their corresponding abatement costs 
(UK for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 2019, p. 14, Point 3.42). Because in the EU 
there are separate emissions reduction targets for the traded sector (where emissions are covered 
by the EU Emission Trading Scheme, EU ETS) and for the non-traded sector (where emissions 
are not covered by the EU ETS), the UK government treats emissions in the two sectors as 
different commodities and values them differently: CO2 emissions which occur in the traded 
sector are valued at the Traded Price of Carbon, whereas CO2 emissions in the non-traded sector 
are valued at the Non-Traded Price of Carbon (UK for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy, 
2019, p. 15, Point 3.45). 
 
Although drivers in the UK already internalise the cost of CO2 emissions by paying the fuel 
duty (Santos, 2017a, p. 124) and VED, it is nonetheless interesting to explore whether including 
CO2 emissions in the model significantly changes the present value of the TCO for the different 
vehicles. 
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3.2 Vehicles 
 
As explained above, five propulsion types were modelled: petrol, diesel, hybrid electric vehicles 
(HEVs), plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) and battery electric vehicles (BEVs).6 Within 
these propulsion types, there are small, medium and large cars, and so the most popular models 
within each size category were identified. In order to do this, we used the database of cars 
registered for the first time in the UK by make and model, collected by the UK Driver and 
Licensing Agency and published by the UK Department for Transport (2018b). 
 
Once all 15 cars were selected, their fuel and/or electricity consumption and CO2 emissions 
were taken directly from the manufacturers’ websites.7 
 
Table 4 presents all models and their characteristics, along with all the taxes and subsidies 
applicable on the cars modelled in the UK in 2017. Taxes and subsidies were excluded from 
benchmark calculations, so that the true gap in TCO could be estimated. 
 
 
6 HEVs are relatively common now. They use two different forms of power: an electric motor and an 
internal combustion engine. They are grid-independent because the electricity is produced by the 
regenerative braking system when the vehicle is running on petrol/diesel, and stored in the battery for 
use later on. PHEVs also run on two forms of power, but they source the electricity from the grid. 
Finally, BEVs rely on a battery, which stores electricity and needs to be charged regularly. Both PEHVs 
and BEVs are grid-dependent or plug-in vehicles. 
7 It is worth noting, however, that the data concerning the vehicles’ energy consumption, charging time 
and CO2 emissions reported by manufacturers may differ from actual usage. 
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Table 3: Eligible emission categories and levels of subsidies for different types of grid-dependent vehicles in the UK in 2017, 2018 and 2020 
Emission category CO2 
emissions 
Zero 
emissions 
range 
Level of subsidy in £, 
2017 prices 
Vehicles under the study eligible for grant 
   2017 2018 2020 2017 2018 2020 
 
Category 1 <50g/km 
 
 
>70 miles 
 
 
4500 3500 3000 BMW i3 
Nissan Leaf 
Tesla X 
BMW i3 
Nissan Leaf 
Tesla X 
BMW i3 
Nissan Leaf 
Category 2 <50g/km 
 
10-69 miles 
 
2500      0      0 BMW 330e PHEV 
Mitsubishi Outlander 
PHEV 
  
Category 3 50-75g/km >20 miles 2500       0       0 Mini Countryman PHEV   
Source: UK Office for Low Emission Vehicles (2016, p. 1; 2018) and UK Department for Transport and Office for Low Emission Vehicles (2020b) 
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Table 4: Vehicles modelled 
Vehicle size Small Medium Large 
Propulsion type Petrol Diesel HEV PHEV BEV Petrol Diesel HEV PHEV BEV Petrol Diesel HEV PHEV BEV 
Make Ford Ford Toyota Mini BMW Ford VW Toyota BMW Nissan Nissan Nissan Toyota Mitsu-
bishi 
Tesla 
Model Fiesta 
Turbo 
Fiesta 
TDCi 
Yaris Coun-
tryman 
Cooper  
i3 Focus Golf 
TDi 
Auris 
Hybrid 
330e Leaf Qash-
qai 
DiG  
Qash-
qai dCi 
C-HR 
HEV 
Outla-
nder 
Model 
X 
Reference Fiesta 
petrol 
Fiesta 
diesel 
Yaris 
hybrid 
Mini 
PHEV 
i3 EV Focus 
petrol 
Golf 
diesel 
Auris 
Hybrid 
BMW 
PHEV 
Leaf 
EV  
Qash-
qai 
petrol  
Qash-
qai 
diesel  
C-HR 
Hybrid 
Outla-
nder 
PHEV  
Tesla 
EV 
Base price £ (no tax) 11,225 12,991 13,082 25,833 27,783 16,595 16,404 18,011 29,916 22,696 15,900 17,392 19,453 30,583 61,650 
VAT 20% (3) 2,245 2,598.3 2,616.5 5,166.6 5,556.6 3,319.1 3,280.8 3,602.3 5,983.3 4,539.2 3,180 3,478.3 3,890.6 6,116.6 12,330 
Price inc. VAT (£) 13,470 15,590 15,699 31,000 33,340 19,915 19,685 21,614 35,900 27,235 19,080 20,870 23,344 36,700 73,980 
Subsidy as of 2017 (£) NA NA NA 2,500 4,500 NA NA NA 2,500 4,500 NA NA NA 2,500 4,500 
VED 1st year (£) 165 145 95 0 0 145 165 115 0 0 165 145 95 0 0 
VED remaining years (£) 140 140 130 130 0 140 140 130 130 0 140 140 130 130 310*  
Fuel consumption 
l/100km  
5.1 3.80 3.7 2.10 0 4.60 4.10 3.90 1.90 0 5.60 3.80 3.80 1.70 0 
Electricity consumption 
kWh/100km 
0 0 0 13.20 13.10 0 0 0 11.90 19.40 0 0 0 13.40 21.40 
CO2 emissions g/km as 
indicated by 
manufacturer 
115 96 84 49 0 105 106 91 44 0 129 99 86 41 0 
Source: Car prices, energy consumption, CO2 emissions (manufacturers’ websites); VED rates and subsidies (UK Office for Low Emission Vehicles, 2018a). All 
monetary values expressed in 2017 prices. 
* Only payable in 2018 and 2019. 
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The different cars in each size category may offer different features. For example, some 
consumers may be especially interested in achieving high speeds, whilst others may especially 
value the maximum power the engine can put. Using the methodology proposed by 
Nieuwenhuis (2014), we compare the different cars in each size category in relation to a number 
of features. We present the methodology and results in Appendix C. The main conclusion from 
this comparison is that none of the cars modelled in this study outperforms all others in its own 
size category, at least for the features modelled. 
 
Another interesting issue is that the car models with the highest number of registrations in each 
car size category/propulsion type combination have different market positioning. For example, 
for small cars, the BMW i3 and the Mini Countryman Cooper have a higher market positioning 
than the Ford Fiesta. For medium cars, the BMW 330e has a higher market positioning than the 
Ford Focus. For large cars, Tesla X is a luxury car, that targets more high-end consumers, and 
is positioned differently from the Nissan Qashqai dci. BMW is typically perceived as a brand 
of cars with high performance but also high price, whereas Ford, Mitsubishi, Nissan, 
Volkswgen, and Toyota, are perceived as mass-market brands (Hirsh et al., 2003). 
 
The high initial price attached to cars with high market positioning has not prevented some of 
them from achieving the highest number of registrations in their size category/propulsion type, 
which was the criterion used to select the specific models in this study. In order to compare car 
models with similar market positioning an additional six car models are introduced in Appendix 
B. 
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4. Results and discussion 
 
In this section we present all our results and discuss them. The two areas where we focus are 
TCO and breakeven points. The present value of TCO, which we defined in Section 3, include 
the purchase price, fuel/electricity costs, and non-fuel operating costs over the lifetime of the 
vehicle, discounted to the value of the base year, which in this study is 2017, using four different 
discount rates (0%, 6%, 30%, and 60%). Breakeven point is defined as the point in time at 
which the TCO of two different technologies break even, or in other words, the point in time at 
which the owner of the vehicle has recovered the initial higher purchase price thanks to the 
lower operating costs. 
 
4.1 Baseline model 
 
Our baseline model excludes all taxes and subsides, so that we can get a clear idea of where the 
actual TCO of the different technologies stand in the UK, in order to later estimate what taxes 
and subsidies are needed in order to achieve cost parity. 
 
4.1.1 Present value of TCO 
 
Table 5 shows the TCO discounted to the base year, 2017, for all the cars modelled, under the 
four discount rates assumed. Table 6 shows the ratio of TCO using the petrol car in each size 
category as the reference. 
  
8 
 
Table 5: Total Costs of Ownership, in £, 2017 prices, excluding any taxes or subsidies 
 
Vehicles 0% 6% 30% 60% 
S
m
al
l 
Fiesta petrol 22,125 19,082 14,720 13,440 
Fiesta diesel 23,017 20,228 16,223 15,043 
Yaris Hybrid 23,041 20,271 16,293 15,121 
Mini PHEV 31,970 30,228 27,745 27,026 
i3 EV 33,682 32,029 29,656 28,959 
M
ed
iu
m
 
Focus petrol 27,159 24,214 19,989 18,748 
Golf diesel 26,631 23,784 19,696 18,493 
Auris Hybrid 28,104 25,296 21,263 20,076 
BMW PHEV 35,578 33,972 31,683 31,019 
Leaf EV 30,248 28,125 25,080 24,188 
L
ar
g
e 
Qashqai petrol 27,136 23,995 19,496 18,178 
Qashqai diesel 27,417 24,628 20,623 19,443 
C-HR Hybrid 29,479 26,690 22,684 21,505 
Outlander PHEV 36,504 34,825 32,430 31,736 
Tesla EV 69,727 67,454 64,196 63,243 
 
Note: Base year: 2017, Period modelled: 2017-2029 
Source: Own calculations as explained in the text 
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Table 6: Total Costs of Ownership ratios excluding any taxes or subsidies, with petrol 
car as the reference 
 
Vehicles 0% 6% 30% 60% 
S
m
al
l 
Fiesta petrol 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Fiesta diesel 1.04 1.06 1.10 1.12 
Yaris Hybrid 1.04 1.06 1.11 1.13 
Mini PHEV 1.44 1.58 1.88 2.01 
i3 EV 1.52 1.68 2.01 2.15 
M
ed
iu
m
 
Focus petrol 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Golf diesel 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 
Auris Hybrid 1.03 1.04 1.06 1.07 
BMW PHEV 1.31 1.40 1.58 1.65 
Leaf EV 1.11 1.16 1.25 1.29 
L
ar
g
e 
Qashqai petrol 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Qashqai diesel 1.01 1.03 1.06 1.07 
C-HR Hybrid 1.09 1.11 1.16 1.18 
Outlander PHEV 1.35 1.45 1.66 1.75 
Tesla EV 2.57 2.81 3.29 3.48 
Note: Base year: 2017, Period modelled: 2017-2029 
Source: Table 5 
 
Tables 5 and 6 show that, not surprisingly, higher discount rates play against vehicles that are 
more expensive to buy but cheaper to operate. The 0% discount rate is only presented to 
illustrate that even in the case when consumers attach the same weight to present and future 
disbursements, cleaner cars have, in general, higher TCO. Tables 5 and 6 also show that TCO 
for petrol and diesel cars, and HEVs are very similar within each car size category and discount 
rate, with diesel cars having slightly lower TCO in the medium size category. They also show 
that TCO are higher, and in some cases, substantially higher, for PHEVs and BEVs, with BEVs 
exhibiting the highest TCO in the small and large size categories. In all cases, the higher 
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purchase price of PHEVs and BEVs outweighs the potential savings in the operating costs over 
the vehicle’s lifetime. This means that at no point in time do PHEVs or BEVs break even with 
petrol cars, diesel cars, or HEVs, in the absence of taxes and subsidies, as we show graphically 
in Section 4.1.2. 
 
4.1.2 Breakeven points 
 
When cleaner, more expensive cars, have lower operating costs, the owner might recover the 
initial higher purchase costs before the end of the vehicle life. Without taxes or subsidies this 
is completely impossible with the current TCO, as would have been evident from Tables 5 and 
6. 
 
Figures 4 to 7 illustrate the year-on-year trajectory of the TCO for all the vehicles modelled in 
this study. The TCO curves never cross within the period modelled. Figure 4 shows the TCO 
trajectories under a 0% discount rate. This is essentially a benchmark, as it is very unlikely that 
anyone would attach the same weight to present and future costs. Consumers typically prefer 
to defer costs in time. A 0% discount rate provides the most favourable platform for clean 
technologies, with a higher purchase price but lower operating costs. Figures 4a-4c show that 
even under this unrealistic 0% discount rate assumption, PHEVs and BEVs are more expensive 
throughout the period modelled. In other words, the higher initial cost is never recovered. The 
picture only gets worse with higher discount rates. Figures 5a-5c and 6a-6c show the TCO 
trajectories under a 6% discount rate and under a 30% discount rate, respectively. Finally, 
Figures 7a-7c show the TCO trajectories under a 60% discount rate, representing consumers 
who place a much higher weight on costs incurred today relative to costs incurred in the future. 
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Any future savings from cleaner vehicles are of little interest to these consumers so the gap 
between TCO is even larger, as would have also been evident from Tables 5 and 6. 
 
The effect of the very low and very high discount rates used can be seen by comparing Figures 
4a-c with Figures 7a-c. The TCO curves in Figures 4a-c get closer over time, although they 
never cross each other within the period modelled. The TCO curves in Figures 7a-c are virtually 
parallel. Although the actual discount rates of car buyers in the UK are not known, the main 
finding from the analysis so far is that PHEVs and BEVs never break even with petrol cars, 
diesel cars or HEVs during the period modelled, and this applies not only to any possible 
discount rate but also to the unrealistic 0% discount rate, where consumers place the same 
emphasis to present and future costs. Prolonging the lines in Figures 4a-c yields breakeven 
points between grid-dependent and petrol cars that fall beyond any reasonable payback period, 
as in many cases the vehicles would have been scrapped by then. 
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Figure 4a: Small cars TCO 2017-2029, excluding any taxes or subsidies, under a 0% discount 
rate 
 
Source: Own calculations 
  
10,000
15,000
20,000
25,000
30,000
35,000
TC
O
 (
£
)
Year
Fiesta petrol Fiesta diesel Yaris Hybrid Mini PHEV i3 EV
13 
 
Figure 4b: Medium cars TCO 2017-2029, excluding any taxes or subsidies, under a 0% discount 
rate 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Figure 4c: Large cars TCO 2017-2029, excluding any taxes or subsidies, under a 0% discount 
rate 
 
Source: Own calculations 
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Figure 5a: Small cars TCO 2017-2029, excluding any taxes or subsidies, under a 6% discount 
rate 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Figure 5b: Medium cars TCO 2017-2029, excluding any taxes or subsidies, under a 6% discount 
rate 
 
Source: Own calculations 
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Figure 5c: Large cars TCO 2017-2029, excluding any taxes or subsidies, under a 6% discount 
rate 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Figure 6a: Small cars TCO 2017-2029, excluding any taxes or subsidies, under a 30% discount 
rate 
 
Source: Own calculations 
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Figure 6b: Medium cars TCO 2017-2029, excluding any taxes or subsidies, under a 30% 
discount rate 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Figure 6c: Large cars TCO 2017-2029, excluding any taxes or subsidies, under a 30% discount 
rate 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
15,000
17,000
19,000
21,000
23,000
25,000
27,000
29,000
31,000
33,000
TC
O
 (
£
)
Year
Focus petrol Golf diesel Auris Hybrid BMW PHEV Leaf EV
15,000
25,000
35,000
45,000
55,000
65,000
75,000
TC
O
 (
£
)
Year
Qashqai petrol Qashqai diesel C-HR Hybrid Outlander PHEV Tesla EV
17 
 
Figure 7a: Small cars TCO 2017-2029, excluding any taxes or subsidies, under a 60% discount 
rate 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Figure 7b: Medium cars TCO 2017-2029, excluding any taxes or subsidies, under a 60% 
discount rate 
 
Source: Own calculations 
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Figure 7c: Large cars TCO 2017-2029, excluding any taxes or subsidies, under a 60% discount 
rate 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
4.1.3 Baseline model: final thoughts 
 
Although the price of PHEVs and BEVs has fallen over the last decade, the initial price of these 
vehicles is still relatively high and is never recovered over the vehicle lifetime in the absence 
of any taxes or subsidies. Until these technologies become fully competitive with petrol, diesel 
and HEVs, government intervention is needed. The UK government has a set of energy taxes 
and vehicle subsidies and taxes in place. The following section concentrates on whether these 
taxes and subsidies make grid-dependent vehicles more attractive to car buyers. 
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In this section we add all taxes and subsidies to the analysis in order to understand if they change 
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4.2.1 Present value of TCO 
 
Table 7 shows the TCO discounted to the base year, 2017, for all the cars modelled, under the 
four discount rates assumed, including all energy taxes and vehicle subsidies and taxes. Table 
8 shows the ratio of TCO using the petrol car in each size category as the reference. The main 
conclusion is that energy taxes and vehicle subsidies and taxes go some way towards making 
cleaner cars more competitive, when these results are compared to those presented in Section 
4.1. However, the effects vary by vehicle model, with the Leaf EV, being the only grid-
dependent car amongst the cars included in this study, that becomes competitive with the petrol 
car (in the medium size category) under all discount rates, except for the 60% discount rate.8 
Focusing on the 6% and 30% discount rates, which span the range in which actual (implicit) 
discount rates are likely to fall, we can see that the Leaf EV, which was borderline competitive 
with its petrol counterpart under no government intervention (i.e., no taxes or subsidies), is now 
fully competitive, with TCO ratios of 0.88 and 1 under the 6% and 30% assumptions, 
respectively. 
 
The main problem with most of the grid-dependent cars included in this study, which were 
selected because they were the vehicles with the highest number of registrations in the UK in 
2017 in their size category/propulsion type combination, is that they have a substantially higher 
initial purchase price and market positioning. TCO are very sensitive to purchase price, as 
shown by the sensitivity analysis presented in Appendix B. For that reason, an extended analysis 
 
8 It also becomes competitive with the HEV under all discount rates, and with the diesel car under all 
discount rates, except for the 60% one. 
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is presented in that appendix, to include BEVs of similar market positioning to the petrol 
reference within each size category. 
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Table 7: Total Costs of Ownership, in £, 2017 prices, including all current taxes and 
subsidies 
Vehicles 0% 6% 30% 60% 
S
m
al
l 
Fiesta petrol 33,299 27,738 19,787 17,467 
Fiesta diesel 32,719 27,925 21,060 19,050 
Yaris Hybrid 32,452 27,753 21,023 19,053 
Mini PHEV 39,287 36,197 31,790 30,511 
i3 EV 34,911 33,209 30,765 30,048 
M
ed
iu
m
 
Focus petrol 36,868 32,108 25,302 23,315 
Golf diesel 37,454 32,482 25,367 23,285 
Auris Hybrid 38,800 33,983 27,087 25,068 
BMW PHEV 43,419 40,548 36,454 35,265 
Leaf EV 30,544 28,347 25,199 24,276 
L
ar
g
e 
Qashqai petrol 39,941 34,084 25,716 23,276 
Qashqai diesel 38,000 33,206 26,341 24,331 
C-HR Hybrid 40,304 35,546 28,733 26,739 
Outlander PHEV 44,220 41,350 37,254 36,064 
Tesla EV 78,462 76,057 72,538 71,444 
Note: Base year: 2017, Period modelled: 2017-2029 
Source: Own calculations as explained in the text 
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Table 8: Total Costs of Ownership ratios including all current taxes and subsidies, with 
petrol car as the reference 
Vehicles 0% 6% 30% 60% 
S
m
al
l 
Fiesta petrol 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Fiesta diesel 0.98 1.01 1.06 1.09 
Yaris Hybrid 0.97 1.00 1.06 1.09 
Mini PHEV 1.18 1.30 1.61 1.75 
i3 EV 1.05 1.20 1.55 1.72 
M
ed
iu
m
 
Focus petrol 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Golf diesel 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.00 
Auris Hybrid 1.05 1.06 1.07 1.08 
BMW PHEV 1.18 1.26 1.44 1.51 
Leaf EV 0.83 0.88 1.00 1.04 
L
ar
g
e 
Qashqai petrol 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Qashqai diesel 0.95 0.97 1.02 1.05 
C-HR Hybrid 1.01 1.04 1.12 1.15 
Outlander PHEV 1.11 1.21 1.45 1.55 
Tesla EV 1.96 2.23 2.82 3.07 
 
Note: Base year: 2017, Period modelled: 2017-2029 
Source: Table 7 
 
4.2.2 Breakeven points 
 
Although the Leaf EV has a similar present value of TCO to that of its petrol, diesel and HEV 
counterparts, the present value is calculated over the period 2017-2029 and car owners will 
typically want to offset the initial higher purchase price before the end of the vehicle’s lifetime. 
Therefore, the breakeven points need to be identified. Figures 8 and 9 show the TCO trajectories 
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when energy taxes and vehicle subsidies and taxes are included, under the 6% and 30% discount 
rates assumptions, which are the most realistic. 
 
Under a 6% discount rate, the Leaf EV breaks even with both the petrol and diesel cars in the 
medium size category in 2021, so the car owner has to wait four years to recover the difference 
in higher purchase price. This may be an acceptable payback period for some prospective car 
buyers but not for others.9 The payback period under a 30% discount rate is, of course, longer. 
Under a 30% discount rate, the Leaf EV breaks even with the petrol car in the medium size 
category in 2029, and with the diesel car, in 2027. Interestingly, the Leaf EV breaks even with 
the Auris Hybrid in the second year, under both a 6% and a 30% discount rate assumption.10 11 
 
Although including all taxes and subsidies makes the grid-dependent vehicles modelled in this 
study more competitive, except for the Leaf EV discussed above, none of them breaks even 
with petrol cars, diesel cars or HEVs under any discount rate. 
 
9 In the US, for example, car buyers expect payback in 3 years in order to pay more for increased fuel 
economy of petrol cars (Greene et al., 2013). 
10 Furthermore, the Leaf EV breaks even with the Auris Hybrid in the third year under a 60% discount 
rate. 
11 According to the database from the UK Department for Transport (2018b), in 2017 the total first 
registrations of Auris Hybrid were 10,704 and the total first registrations of the Leaf EV were 5,665. It 
is difficult to assert the reasons behind this preference. It could be linked to the specific features the two 
cars offer, as discussed in Appendix C, or to issues of range anxiety, as suggested by Sierzchula et al., 
2014; Lieven, 2015; Bonges III and Lusk, 2016; Mersky et al., 2016; Egbue et al., 2017; Liao et al., 
2017; and Wang et al., 2017. It could also be the result of many consumers ignoring the TCO when 
choosing what car to buy, or being myopic/inattentive, as postulated by Gerarden et al. (2017) and Leard 
(2018), which would reinforce the need for labelling, as proposed by Dumortier et al (2015). In any 
case, this pair-wise comparison is somewhat limited as there are a range of makes, models and 
propulsion types consumers can choose from. 
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In the small size category, the Fiesta petrol is the vehicle with the lowest TCO, closely followed 
by the Fiesta diesel and the Yaris Hybrid. Although the i3 EV has lower TCO than the Mini 
PHEV from the second year onwards, both cars have substantially higher TCO than petrol, 
diesel or HEVs throughout the period modelled. 
 
In the large size category, the petrol and diesel cars are the options with the lowest present value 
of TCO over the period modelled. Like in the other groups, the grid-independent HEV is only 
slightly more expensive over its lifetime than the petrol and diesel vehicles. Turning to the 
PHEV, the Outlander has a higher present value of TCO than all the other vehicles, except for 
the Tesla EV, whose TCO are by far the highest. 
 
The caveat in this analysis is that, as advanced in Section 3.2, the BMW i3 and the Mini 
Countryman Cooper have a higher market positioning than the Ford Fiesta. Similarly, the Tesla 
X is a luxury car. These cars attract a different group of consumers. They had the highest 
number of new registrations in their size category/propulsion type in 2017, despite the 
insufficient subsidy, which supports the idea of market segmentation. Other BEV models with 
lower purchase prices are included in an extended analysis in Appendix B, for comparison 
purposes. When energy taxes and vehicle subsidies and taxes are included in the calculations, 
these lower priced BEVs either break even with their petrol reference within a reasonable period 
of time, or have only slightly higher TCO. Some are close to reaching cost parity even without 
any fuel taxes or vehicle subsidies or taxes. 
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Figure 8a: Small cars TCO 2017-2029, including current taxes and subsidies, under a 6% 
discount rate 
 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Figure 8b: Medium cars TCO 2017-2029, including current taxes and subsidies, under a 6% 
discount rate 
 
Source: own calculations 
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Figure 8c: Large cars TCO 2017-2029, including current taxes and subsidies, under a 6% 
discount rate 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
Figure 9a: Small cars TCO 2017-2029, including current taxes and subsidies, under a 30% 
discount rate 
 
Source: own calculations 
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Figure 9b: Medium cars TCO 2017-2029, including current taxes and subsidies, under a 30% 
discount rate 
 
 
Source: own calculations 
 
Figure 9c: Large cars TCO 2017-2029, including current taxes and subsidies, under a 30% 
discount rate 
 
Source: Own calculations 
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4.2.3 Taxes and subsidies: final thoughts 
 
Energy taxes and vehicle subsidies and taxes change relative TCO, making grid-dependent 
vehicles somewhat more attractive than if there were no taxes or subsidies. From the PHEVs 
and BEVs with the highest number of registrations in the UK in 2017 for each car size 
category/propulsion type combination, only the Leaf EV breaks even with petrol, diesel and 
HEV, with all other grid-dependent cars still having higher TCO than petrol, diesel and HEVs, 
when taxes and subsidies are included in the calculations. 
 
However, the initial purchase price is of fundamental importance, as shown by the sensitivity 
analysis presented in Appendix B. An extended analysis in the same appendix shows that when 
BEVs with lower price tags and comparable market positioning to their petrol reference are 
considered, taxes and subsidies change relative TCO enough for them to either break even 
within a reasonable period of time, or have only slightly higher TCO. 
 
It is interesting that the petrol, diesel and HEVs within each car size category, show similar 
overall TCO. Nonetheless, HEVs do not offer zero emissions at any range and therefore cannot 
be regarded as a long-term solution for decarbonising road transport. 
 
We now turn our attention to an extremely important related topic: CO2 emissions and their 
inclusion in the model. After all, the whole point of accelerating electric vehicle market 
penetration is to reduce CO2 emissions from road transport. 
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4.3 Model including CO2 emissions 
 
Adding the cost of CO2 emissions to the TCO plays in favour of cleaner technologies, but only 
marginally. The problem here is that the cost per tonne of CO2 recommended by the UK 
government is too low to make any difference. In fact, the costs per tonne of CO2 recommended 
by most governments and accepted in the academic literature are, in general, low, as previously 
found by Liu and Santos (2015) for the US case, Olson (2015) for the Norwegian case, and 
Zhao et al. (2015) for the Chinese case. All three papers argue that subsidies are not efficient 
from an economic point of view, mainly because of the low values of CO2 costs assumed. 
 
The ratios of TCO taking petrol as the reference barely change when the central values of non-
traded CO2 emissions (UK Department for Transport, 2018e, Table A 3.4) are added to the 
model. This applies to all car size categories, all discount rates, and for the model with and the 
one without taxes and subsidies. Adding the cost of CO2 emissions to the model that includes 
all current taxes and subsidies is essentially double counting, because energy taxes and vehicle 
subsidies and taxes are already designed with CO2 emissions in mind. Nonetheless, the exercise 
was conducted to illustrate that the current CO2 values recommended by the UK government 
make no difference to the results. Table 9 shows the TCO ratios once the costs of CO2 are taken 
into account. 
 
Testing for sensitivity, the results stay virtually unchanged when the high non-traded values 
(UK Department for Transport, 2018e, Table A 3.4), instead of the central ones, are used. 
Furthermore, doubling these high non-traded values changes TCO ratios only slightly, and does 
not affect the conclusions. These results are shown in Appendix B. 
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The cost of carbon would need to take much higher values than those generally accepted by the 
scientific community in order to trigger any change leading to substantial emission reductions 
(Santos, 2017b, p. 73). 
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Table 9: Total Costs of Ownership ratios, including CO2 costs, with petrol car as the reference 
 
 Without taxes or subsidies With taxes and subsidies 
Vehicles 0% 6% 30% 60% 0% 6% 30% 60% 
S
m
al
l 
Fiesta petrol 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Fiesta diesel 1.03 1.05 1.09 1.11 0.98 1.00 1.06 1.09 
Yaris Hybrid 1.02 1.05 1.10 1.12 0.97 0.99 1.06 1.09 
Mini PHEV 1.39 1.53 1.85 1.98 1.15 1.28 1.58 1.73 
i3 EV 1.44 1.60 1.96 2.11 1.01 1.16 1.52 1.70 
M
ed
iu
m
 
Focus petrol 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Golf diesel 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 1.02 1.01 1.00 1.00 
Auris Hybrid 1.03 1.04 1.06 1.07 1.05 1.05 1.07 1.07 
BMW PHEV 1.27 1.37 1.56 1.64 1.15 1.24 1.43 1.50 
Leaf EV 1.07 1.12 1.23 1.27 0.80 0.86 0.98 1.03 
L
ar
g
e 
Qashqai petrol 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 
Qashqai diesel 1.00 1.02 1.05 1.06 0.94 0.97 1.02 1.04 
C-HR Hybrid 1.06 1.09 1.15 1.17 1.00 1.03 1.11 1.14 
Outlander PHEV 1.29 1.40 1.63 1.72 1.08 1.19 1.43 1.53 
Tesla EV 2.44 2.69 3.22 3.42 1.89 2.16 2.77 3.03 
 
Note: Base year: 2017, Period modelled: 2017-2029 
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Given that CO2 emissions from road transport need to be drastically reduced and eventually 
brought down to zero, and that the time window is rapidly closing, the obvious question is what 
financial incentives would make cleaner technologies competitive, and what cleaner 
technologies should be favoured. 
 
Within each size category, CO2 emissions are highest for petrol cars, followed by diesel 
vehicles, HEVs, PHEVs and BEVs, in that order. Because of the models that made it to the 
medium size category, our medium diesel car emits slightly higher CO2 per km than the petrol 
car in that size category. This, however, is a feature specific to the two models in question: the 
Focus petrol and the Golf diesel. In general, however, diesel cars tend to emit less CO2 because 
although emissions per litre are higher for diesel than for petrol, emissions per km are always 
lower due to the higher fuel efficiency of diesel relative to petrol. Because of this, diesel in 
Europe, including the UK, was perceived as an easy and quick way of reducing CO2 emissions 
from road transport, and this opportunity was seized by car manufacturers, who managed to 
comply with CO2 targets with little effort (Transport and Environment, 2018). Leaving to one 
side that CO2 emissions from diesel are no more than 25% to 30% lower than those from petrol, 
and this is nowhere enough to decarbonise road transport, diesel was classified as ‘carcinogenic’ 
by the World Health Organization in 2012 (International Agency for Research on Cancer, 2012) 
so this in itself constitutes a good reason to phase it out. In addition, there is ample evidence 
that diesel vehicles produce disproportionally more air pollution than other vehicles, and that 
air pollution has negative impacts on the respiratory, cardiovascular and neurological systems 
(Liu and Grigg, 2018). That is why diesel vehicles in the UK pay a higher VED rate, as shown 
in Table 4, and discussed in Section 3.1.4. 
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The Clean Air Strategy 2019 (UK Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs, 2019) 
also sets very ambitious targets for cleaning the air in the UK, partly banking on the sales ban 
of (petrol and) diesel cars by 2040, or potentially, 2035, pending the results of the 2020 
consultation discussed in Section 1. Last but not least, the diesel emissions scandal which broke 
in September 2015 has made it difficult to promote the idea that diesel can be reconciled with 
reductions in air pollution (Schiermeier, 2015). 
 
The emissions from PHEVs are between 40% and 50% lower than those from HEVs, depending 
on the car make and model. The present value of the total costs of CO2 emissions of all the 
vehicles modelled under the four discount rates is shown in Table 10.  
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Table 10: Present value of costs of CO2 emitted, in £, 2017 prices 
Vehicles 0% 6% 30% 60% 
S
m
al
l 
Fiesta petrol 1,335 953 413 257 
Fiesta diesel 1,114 796 344 215 
Yaris Hybrid 975 696 301 188 
Mini PHEV 569 406 176 110 
i3 EV 0 0 0 0 
M
ed
iu
m
 
Focus petrol 1,218 870 377 235 
Golf diesel 1,230 879 380 237 
Auris Hybrid 1,056 754 327 204 
BMW PHEV 511 365 158 99 
Leaf EV 0 0 0 0 
L
ar
g
e 
Qashqai petrol 1,497 1,069 463 289 
Qashqai diesel 1,149 821 355 222 
C-HR Hybrid 998 713 309 193 
Outlander PHEV 476 340 147 92 
Tesla EV 0 0 0 0 
Note: Base year: 2017, Period modelled: 2017-2029 
Source: Own calculations 
 
Table 10 confirms that the UK government is thinking in the right direction, as the financial 
incentives in place impact vehicles according to their CO2 emissions. For example, VED rates 
vary according to the car CO2 emissions. Also, petrol and diesel are heavily taxed, affecting 
not just petrol and diesel cars, but also HEVs and PHEVs.  
 
It is also worth noting that the PHEVs and BEVs modelled in this study benefited from the 
subsidies that were in place in 2017, shown on Table 3 in Section 3. However, in October 2018, 
the PHEV subsidies, which were £2,500, were terminated, and the BEV subsidies were reduced 
from £4,500 to £3,500, to “ensure that the grant remains sustainable” (UK Office for Low 
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Emission Vehicles, 2018b). The BEV subsidies were then further reduced in March 2020, from 
£3,500 to £3,000, and cars costing £50,000 or more were excluded (UK Department for 
Transport and Office for Low Emission Vehicles, 2020b). 
 
Given that PHEVs are not zero emission vehicles, eliminating PHEV subsidies, as the UK 
government has done, makes sense. However, reducing BEV subsidies, when purchase prices 
have not decreased, is debatable. With a subsidy of £3,000, the Leaf EV, for example, breaks 
even with the Focus petrol and the Golf diesel under a 6% discount rate but not under a 30% 
discount rate. The extended analysis in Appendix B shows that, as subsidies decrease, fewer 
BEVs are fully competitive with their petrol counterparts, and are only so at lower discount 
rates. 
 
The following section reflects on potential policies that would help make BEVs more 
competitive. 
 
4.4 Policies 
 
Policies to accelerate electric vehicle market penetration can include a range of interventions 
that do no entail any financial incentives, such as use of bus lanes and low emission zones, or 
information campaigns, or actions that include some relatively minor financial incentives, such 
as free parking on public roads and exemption from charging in congestion charging zones or 
low emission zones. 
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In the present study, however, we concentrate on relative TCO and how these can be changed 
with taxes and subsidies.12 From the environmental model in Section 4.3, it is clear that PHEVs, 
which are relatively very expensive and rely on fossil fuels to some extent, are cleaner rather 
than clean. For that reason, and bearing in mind that the ultimate aim should be to completely 
decarbonise road transport, the removal of PHEV subsidies from October 2018 can be 
considered a step in the right direction. Policy efforts should concentrate on BEVs, which are 
zero emission. 
 
If relative TCO are to be changed, the two potential avenues are subsidies and taxes. We explore 
these options and discuss them below. 
 
4.4.1 Subsidies 
 
Subsidies for BEVs typically take the form of a one-off disbursement by the government, as is 
the case of plug-in grants in the UK. The actual amount will not only have an impact on TCO 
but will also have an impact on when the BEV breaks even with its petrol, diesel and HEV 
counterparts. If the present value of TCO is the same for BEVs and conventional technologies 
but the break-even point occurs far in the future, the attractiveness of BEVs is jeopardised. 
 
The BMW i3 and the Tesla X sit at the high end of the market and attract consumers willing to 
pay higher TCO. The Tesla X is a luxury car, and because its price exceeds £50,000, it ceased 
 
12 We are not arguing that additional policies are not worth pursuing, and there is evidence that in some contexts 
they can work (Langbroek et al., 2016; Figenbaum, 2017; Li et al., 2020; Wang et al., 2019; Yu et al., 2018; Wang 
et al., 2017). In addition, some authors suggest that the development of a fast and reliable charging infrastructure 
is the most effective policy any government could implement (Bakker and Trip, 2013; Sierzchula et al., 2014; 
Lieven, 2015; Bonges III and Lusk, 2016; Mersky et al., 2016; Egbue et al., 2017; Wang et al., 2017; Santos and 
Davies, 2020). 
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to be eligible for a plug-in grant in March 2020. This seems reasonable, and in line with the 
recommendation by Hardman et al. (2017) that incentives should not be available on high-end 
BEVs. Although Tesla X buyers are typically high-end consumers, Clinton and Steinberg 
(2019) find that the statistically significant positive impact from electric vehicle purchase 
rebates in the US does not vary significantly by the make of the vehicle purchased, such as a 
Tesla versus a non-Tesla. Despite that result, it can be argued that helping mass penetration of 
BEVs in the UK is not about subsidising very expensive cars but about subsidising BEVs from 
mass market brands, which can break even with their petrol counterparts. 
 
The extended analysis in Appendix B shows that the subsidy reductions implemented in 2018 
and 2020 are likely to delay rather than accelerate BEV market penetration in the UK. BEVs 
are more likely to break even with the petrol reference in their size category when subsidies are 
higher. Higher subsidies also move breakeven points forward in time, and this is especially 
important for impatient consumers with high discount rates. 
 
Registrations of new grid-dependent vehicles represent under 3% of total new registrations. 
Reinstating the £4,500 subsidy would boost BEV sales. The subsidies would only be needed 
for a few years, until BEVs are competitive, or until a predetermined market share has been 
reached. With the generally accepted values of CO2, these subsidies would not be efficient from 
an economic point of view. They would, however, make much sense from an environmental 
perspective, and would help decarbonise road transport.  
 
4.4.2 Taxes 
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Breetz and Salon (2018) note that an 8% sales tax in the US applied to a car with a relatively 
high purchase price can cancel out years of fuel savings. Plug-in grants in the UK could be 
replaced with an exemption from VAT. 
 
Exempting BEVs from VAT would effectively be equivalent to a subsidy of 20% of the cost of 
the car. Such a policy would make lower priced BEVs, such as those modelled in Appendix B, 
more competitive and attractive to mass market consumers. The VAT applicable to these cars 
is, in all cases, higher than the £3,000 plug-in grant offered by the government as of 2020. 
Given the high cost to the Treasury in terms of foregone tax revenue, especially in the case of 
expensive cars, a compromise could entail capping the VAT exemption at £4,500, which was 
the plug-in grant offered by the government until October 2018. In addition, cars with price 
tags in excess of 50,000 could be excluded from the VAT exemption, just like they are from 
the plug-in grant. 
 
4.4.3 Final thoughts on financial incentives 
 
Excluding ultra-low emission vehicles that are non-zero emission and cars with price tags in 
excess of £50,000 from the plug-in grant, as the UK government has done, is sensible. However, 
reducing the plug-in grant from £4,500 in 2017 to £3,000 in 2020 is not. Reinstating the £4,500 
plug-in grant or replacing it with VAT exemptions for battery electric vehicles, capped at 
£4,500, are financial incentives likely to be effective, as there is evidence showing that buyers 
are especially sensitive to incentives that affect the initial cost (Hardman et al., 2017; Ghasri et 
al., 2019). Subsidies have also been found to have a statistically significant positive impact on 
the number of new EV registrations in the US (Wee et al., 2018; Clinton and Steinberg, 2019). 
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5. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
In this study we have assessed whether electric vehicles need subsidies in the UK by comparing 
the TCO of petrol, diesel, hybrid electric vehicles, plug-in hybrid electric vehicles and battery 
electric vehicles bought in the UK in 2017, for three different size categories of cars: large, 
medium and small. For each size category and propulsion type we used the model with the 
highest number of first-time registrations in 2017. We then extended the analysis to include 
lower priced battery electric vehicles. 
 
One methodological contribution of the present study is that, unlike most previous TCO 
calculations, our baseline model excludes all taxes and subsidies. This helps understand where 
the different TCO stand relative to one another. We then added all taxes and subsidies 
applicable to the period 2017-2029, and conducted extensive sensitivity analysis. 
 
Our findings show that TCO are very sensitive to the initial car price. Lower priced electric 
vehicles are not far from reaching cost parity, but they still need subsidies if mass market 
penetration of electric vehicles is to be accelerated, as subsidies help bring breakeven points 
forward in time. 
 
Given that plug-in hybrids are not zero emission, the government’s scrappage of subsidies for 
this propulsion type is a sensible step. The reduction of the plug-in grant for zero emission cars 
from £4,500 in 2017 to £3,000 in 2020, however, does not seem warranted, given the 
government target to end the sale of all new conventional petrol and diesel cars and vans by 
2040, or 2035, pending the results of the 2020 consultation. 
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Battery electric vehicles in the UK need subsidies. This result is in line with findings for other 
countries (Liu and Santos, 2015; Zhao et al., 2015; Bubeck et al., 2016; Diao et al., 2016; 
Hagman et al., 2016; Hao et al., 2017; Lévay et al., 2017; Breetz and Salon, 2018; Palmer et 
al., 2018; Danielis et al., 2018; Weldon et al., 2018; Scorrano et al., 2020). Increasing the plug-
in grant back to £4,500 for zero emission cars or replacing it with VAT exemptions, perhaps 
capped at £4,500, is likely to boost the sale of battery electric vehicles. 
 
One important caveat to this policy recommendation, however, is that, as already highlighted, 
there is the possibility that consumers may ignore TCO when choosing what car to buy, or they 
may be myopic/inattentive, or they may be reluctant to buy battery electric vehicles due to range 
anxiety. Having said that, it is reasonable to assume that if (higher) subsidies were in place, 
consumers that in the absence of (or the presence of lower) subsidies would have not even 
considered buying a battery electric vehicle, would at least consider the idea. Purchase subsidies 
can be very effective (Hardman et al., 2017; Ghasri et al., 2019, Wee et al., 2018; Clinton and 
Steinberg, 2019) and this would be especially the case if, as proposed by Dumortier et al (2015), 
consumers were provided with information on TCO in promotional materials or car labels. 
 
Once battery prices have fallen enough to make battery electric vehicles competitive, or a 
predetermined market share has been reached, subsidies will no longer be needed. A large share 
of battery electric vehicles will also result in substantially lower revenues from fuel duties, 
which represented 5.5% of total tax revenue in 2018/19.13 This is a problem that will need to 
be addressed, but falls outside the scope of the present study.  
 
13 This is exclusive of VAT receipts, and was computed as fuel and vehicle duties, £34.4 billion (UK 
Department for Transport, 2019b, Table TSGB1311/RDE0103), divided by total tax revenue, £620.3 
billion for 2018/19 (HM Revenue & Customs, 2020, p. 6, Table 1). 
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Appendix A: Car manufacturers’ websites 
 
Audi e-tron Quattro pricing and electricity consumption 〈https://www.audi.co.uk〉 
 
BMW i3 and BMW 330e pricing, fuel and electricity consumption and emissions information. 
〈https://www.bmw.co.uk/〉 
 
Ford Fiesta and Ford Focus pricing, fuel consumption and emissions information. 
〈https://www.ford.co.uk/〉 
 
Hyundai Kona Electric pricing and electricity consumption 〈https://www.hyundai.co.uk〉 
 
Kia e-Niro pricing and electricity consumption 〈https://www.kia.com〉 
 
Mini Countryman PHEV pricing, fuel consumption and emissions information. 
〈https://www.mini.co.uk/en_GB/home.html〉 
 
Mitsubishi Outlander pricing, fuel consumption and emissions information. 
〈http://www.mitsubishi-cars.co.uk/〉 
 
Nissan Leaf and Nissan Qashqai pricing, fuel and electricity consumption and emissions 
information. 〈https://www.nissan.co.uk/〉 
 
Renault ZOE pricing and electricity consumption 〈https://www.renault.co.uk〉 
 
42 
 
Skoda CitiGoE pricing 〈https://www.skoda.co.uk/〉 and electricity consumption 
〈https://www.electrive.com/2019/11/21/skoda-begins-manufacturing-the-citigo-e-iv/〉 
 
Tesla Model X electricity consumption information. 
〈https://www.fueleconomy.gov/feg/PowerSearch.do?action=noform&path=1&year1=2017&y
ear2=2018&make=Tesla&baseModel=Model%20X&srchtyp=ymm〉 
 
Tesla Model X pricing information. 〈https://www.tesla.com/en_GB/〉 
 
Toyota Yaris, Toyota Auris and Toyota CH-R pricing, fuel consumption and emissions 
information. 〈https://www.toyota.co.uk/〉 
 
Volkswagen Golf and e-up! pricing, fuel and electricity consumption and emissions 
information. 〈https://www.volkswagen.co.uk/〉 
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Appendix B: Sensitivity analysis 
 
In this Appendix we conduct extensive sensitivity analysis of the model with respect to fuel 
consumption, fuel prices, place of battery charging (home versus work/commercial points), 
average speed, cost of CO2, and car purchase price. We do this for the model without any taxes 
or subsidies. 
 
The findings of this sensitivity analysis are that the conclusions of the model remain the same 
under all discount rates, except, as could have been expected, when the purchase price of 
PHEVs and BEVs is changed. 
 
Sensitivity of the model with respect to fuel consumption 
 
The fuel consumption of petrol and diesel cars and HEVs was doubled and halved, to 
substantially increase and decrease their costs of operation, and in so doing, to decrease and 
increase the difference in TCO with respect to their PHEV and BEV counterparts. 
 
As it can be seen on Table B1, halving or doubling fuel consumption makes virtually no 
difference to the TCO ratios, regardless of the discount rate used. 
 
Sensitivity of the model with respect to fuel prices 
 
Petrol and diesel prices fell in 2020 due to exceptional and unprecedented circumstances, 
caused by a dual shock in both demand and supply of oil. Demand for oil worldwide was 
drastically reduced due to COVID-19, a Pandemic that caused virtually all the countries in the 
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world to introduce restrictions on the movement of people, bringing mobility “almost to a halt” 
(International Energy Agency, 2020). The problem was exacerbated by the breakdown in 
negotiations between the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and 
Russia, which led to an over-supply of oil (Arezki and Nguyen, 2020), a problem that was only 
partly tackled in April that year when they agreed to cut production. In the UK, for example, 
the pre-tax price of petrol and diesel fell by 33% and 27%, respectively, over the first four 
months of 2020. 
 
In order to test for sensitivity, we reduced pre-tax fuel prices for all years by 50%, which is 
exactly equivalent to halving fuel consumption. Even under this extreme assumption, the model 
conclusions do not change, as can be seen from the TCO ratios in Table B1. 
 
Sensitivity of the model with respect to place of battery charging 
 
The assumption of 2/3 of charging done at home and 1/3 of charging done at work or at 
commercial stations is arbitrary, so we tested for sensitivity of results by assuming that all the 
charging was done at home, or all the charging was done at work. The change makes no 
difference to the conclusions, as can be seen from Table B1. 
 
Sensitivity of the model with respect to speed 
 
We doubled and halved the speed assumed and the TCO ratios remain virtually unchanged, as 
Table B1 shows. 
 
Sensitivity of the model with respect to costs of CO2 
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The central non-traded values of CO2, from Table A 3.4 of the WebTAG Data Book (UK 
Department for Transport, 2018e) were used in all the calculations reported in the body of the 
paper. In order to test for sensitivity of TCO with respect to costs of CO2, the higher non-traded 
values of CO2 from the same table were used, and a further test was done by doubling the 
higher values. The TCO ratios yield the same conclusions, regardless of the CO2 value used. 
 
Sensitivity of the model with respect to PHEV and BEV purchase price 
 
One of the most important parameters for the calculation of TCO is the purchase price. In order 
to test for sensitivity, we halved the purchase price of PHEVs and BEVs and, as expected, this 
changed the results, as it can be seen on Table B1. This is not a weakness of our model but a 
strength, as it shows that the initial price is of fundamental importance for TCO. 
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     Table B1: Sensitivity analysis 
Vehicle size Small Medium Large 
Propulsion type Petrol Diesel Hybrid PHEV EV Petrol Diesel Hybrid PHEV EV Petrol Diesel Hybrid PHEV EV 
Reference 
Fiesta 
petrol 
Fiesta 
diesel 
Yaris 
Hybrid 
Mini 
PHEV 
i3 EV 
Focus 
petrol 
Golf 
diesel 
Auris 
Hybrid 
BMW 
PHEV 
Leaf 
EV  
Qashqai 
petrol 
Qashqai 
diesel 
C-HR 
Hybrid 
Outlander 
PHEV 
Tesla 
EV 
                 
0
%
 
Baseline 1.00 1.04 1.04 1.44 1.52 1.00 0.98 1.03 1.31 1.11 1.00 1.01 1.09 1.35 2.57 
Half fuel consumption 1.00 1.07 1.07 1.57 1.65 1.00 0.99 1.05 1.39 1.18 1.00 1.04 1.12 1.45 2.76 
Double fuel 
consumption 
1.00 1.00 1.00 1.25 1.32 1.00 0.97 1.02 1.18 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.04 1.18 2.26 
Half fuel prices 1.00 1.07 1.07 1.53 1.65 1.00 0.99 1.05 1.36 1.18 1.00 1.04 1.12 1.42 2.76 
Double fuel prices 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.31 1.32 1.00 0.97 1.02 1.22 1.00 1.00 0.97 1.04 1.22 2.26 
100% of battery 
charging done at home 
1.00 1.04 1.04 1.46 1.54 1.00 0.98 1.03 1.32 1.13 1.00 1.01 1.09 1.36 2.59 
100% of battery 
charging done at work 
or at commercial 
stations 
1.00 1.04 1.04 1.41 1.49 1.00 0.98 1.03 1.28 1.07 1.00 1.01 1.09 1.32 2.52 
Half speed 1.00 1.04 1.04 1.43 1.51 1.00 0.98 1.03 1.30 1.11 1.00 1.01 1.09 1.33 2.55 
Double speed 1.00 1.04 1.04 1.45 1.53 1.00 0.98 1.04 1.32 1.11 1.00 1.01 1.09 1.35 2.58 
With CO2 non-traded 
values 
1.00 1.03 1.02 1.39 1.44 1.00 0.98 1.03 1.27 1.07 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.29 2.44 
With CO2 non-traded 
values (high estimates) 
1.00 1.02 1.02 1.36 1.40 1.00 0.98 1.02 1.25 1.04 1.00 0.99 1.05 1.27 2.37 
With CO2 non-traded 
values (twice the high 
estimates) 
1.00 1.01 0.99 1.29 1.29 1.00 0.98 1.01 1.20 0.98 1.00 0.98 1.03 1.20 2.20 
Purchase price halved 
for PHEVs and BEVs 
1.00 1.04 1.04 0.86 0.89 1.00 0.98 1.03 0.76 0.70 1.00 1.01 1.09 0.78 1.43 
                 
6
%
 
Baseline 1.00 1.06 1.06 1.58 1.68 1.00 0.98 1.04 1.40 1.16 1.00 1.03 1.11 1.45 2.81 
Half fuel consumption 1.00 1.08 1.09 1.69 1.79 1.00 0.99 1.05 1.47 1.22 1.00 1.05 1.14 1.54 2.98 
Double fuel 
consumption 
1.00 1.02 1.02 1.41 1.49 1.00 0.97 1.03 1.29 1.07 1.00 0.99 1.07 1.31 2.53 
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Half fuel prices 1.00 1.08 1.09 1.66 1.79 1.00 0.99 1.05 1.45 1.22 1.00 1.05 1.14 1.52 2.98 
Double fuel prices 1.00 1.02 1.02 1.45 1.49 1.00 0.97 1.03 1.32 1.07 1.00 0.99 1.07 1.34 2.53 
100% of battery 
charging done at home 
1.00 1.06 1.06 1.60 1.69 1.00 0.98 1.04 1.41 1.18 1.00 1.03 1.11 1.46 2.83 
100% of battery 
charging done at work 
or at commercial 
stations 
1.00 1.06 1.06 1.56 1.65 1.00 0.98 1.04 1.38 1.13 1.00 1.03 1.11 1.43 2.77 
Half speed 1.00 1.06 1.06 1.57 1.67 1.00 0.98 1.04 1.39 1.16 1.00 1.03 1.11 1.44 2.79 
Double speed 1.00 1.06 1.06 1.59 1.68 1.00 0.98 1.04 1.41 1.16 1.00 1.03 1.11 1.46 2.82 
With CO2 non-traded 
values 
1.00 1.05 1.05 1.53 1.60 1.00 0.98 1.04 1.37 1.12 1.00 1.02 1.09 1.40 2.69 
With CO2 non-traded 
values (high estimates) 
1.00 1.04 1.04 1.50 1.56 1.00 0.98 1.04 1.35 1.10 1.00 1.01 1.08 1.38 2.64 
With CO2 non-traded 
values (twice the high 
estimates) 
1.00 1.03 1.02 1.43 1.46 1.00 0.98 1.03 1.31 1.05 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.32 2.48 
Purchase price halved 
for PHEVs and BEVs 
1.00 1.06 1.06 0.91 0.95 1.00 0.98 1.04 0.79 0.69 1.00 1.03 1.11 0.81 1.53 
                 
3
0
%
 
Baseline 1.00 1.10 1.11 1.88 2.01 1.00 0.99 1.06 1.58 1.25 1.00 1.06 1.16 1.66 3.29 
Half fuel consumption 1.00 1.12 1.12 1.95 2.09 1.00 0.99 1.07 1.62 1.28 1.00 1.07 1.18 1.71 3.39 
Double fuel 
consumption 
1.00 1.08 1.08 1.76 1.88 1.00 0.98 1.05 1.51 1.20 1.00 1.04 1.14 1.57 3.11 
Half fuel prices 1.00 1.12 1.12 1.94 2.09 1.00 0.99 1.07 1.61 1.28 1.00 1.07 1.18 1.70 3.39 
Double fuel prices 1.00 1.08 1.08 1.79 1.88 1.00 0.98 1.05 1.53 1.20 1.00 1.04 1.14 1.59 3.11 
100% of battery 
charging done at home 
1.00 1.10 1.11 1.89 2.02 1.00 0.99 1.06 1.59 1.26 1.00 1.06 1.16 1.67 3.30 
100% of battery 
charging done at work 
or at commercial 
stations 
1.00 1.10 1.11 1.87 2.00 1.00 0.99 1.06 1.57 1.24 1.00 1.06 1.16 1.65 3.27 
Half speed 1.00 1.10 1.11 1.87 2.01 1.00 0.99 1.06 1.58 1.25 1.00 1.06 1.16 1.66 3.28 
Double speed 1.00 1.10 1.11 1.89 2.02 1.00 0.99 1.06 1.59 1.26 1.00 1.06 1.16 1.67 3.30 
With CO2 non-traded 
values 
1.00 1.09 1.10 1.85 1.96 1.00 0.99 1.06 1.56 1.23 1.00 1.05 1.15 1.63 3.22 
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With CO2 non-traded 
values (high estimates) 
1.00 1.09 1.09 1.83 1.93 1.00 0.99 1.06 1.55 1.22 1.00 1.05 1.15 1.62 3.18 
With CO2 non-traded 
values (twice the high 
estimates) 
1.00 1.08 1.08 1.77 1.86 1.00 0.99 1.05 1.52 1.19 1.00 1.04 1.13 1.57 3.07 
Purchase price halved 
for PHEVs and BEVs 
1.00 1.10 1.11 1.01 1.07 1.00 0.99 1.06 0.84 0.69 1.00 1.06 1.16 0.88 1.71 
                 
6
0
%
 
Baseline 1.00 1.12 1.13 2.01 2.15 1.00 0.99 1.07 1.65 1.29 1.00 1.07 1.18 1.75 3.48 
Half fuel consumption 1.00 1.13 1.13 2.06 2.21 1.00 0.99 1.07 1.68 1.31 1.00 1.08 1.19 1.78 3.55 
Double fuel 
consumption 
1.00 1.10 1.11 1.92 2.06 1.00 0.98 1.06 1.60 1.25 1.00 1.05 1.16 1.68 3.35 
Half fuel prices 1.00 1.13 1.13 2.05 2.21 1.00 0.99 1.07 1.67 1.31 1.00 1.08 1.19 1.77 3.55 
Double fuel prices 1.00 1.10 1.11 1.94 2.06 1.00 0.98 1.06 1.62 1.25 1.00 1.05 1.16 1.69 3.35 
100% of battery 
charging done at home 
1.00 1.12 1.13 2.02 2.16 1.00 0.99 1.07 1.66 1.30 1.00 1.07 1.18 1.75 3.49 
100% of battery 
charging done at work 
or at commercial 
stations 
1.00 1.12 1.13 2.00 2.14 1.00 0.99 1.07 1.65 1.28 1.00 1.07 1.18 1.74 3.46 
Half speed 1.00 1.12 1.12 2.00 2.15 1.00 0.99 1.07 1.65 1.29 1.00 1.07 1.18 1.74 3.47 
Double speed 1.00 1.12 1.13 2.02 2.16 1.00 0.99 1.07 1.66 1.29 1.00 1.07 1.18 1.75 3.48 
With CO2 non-traded 
values 
1.00 1.11 1.12 1.98 2.11 1.00 0.99 1.07 1.64 1.27 1.00 1.06 1.17 1.72 3.42 
With CO2 non-traded 
values (high estimates) 
1.00 1.11 1.11 1.97 2.09 1.00 0.99 1.07 1.63 1.27 1.00 1.06 1.17 1.71 3.40 
With CO2 non-traded 
values (twice the high 
estimates) 
1.00 1.10 1.10 1.92 2.04 1.00 0.99 1.06 1.61 1.24 1.00 1.06 1.16 1.68 3.32 
Purchase price halved 
for PHEVs and BEVs 
1.00 1.12 1.13 1.05 1.12 1.00 0.99 1.07 0.86 0.68 1.00 1.07 1.18 0.90 1.78 
 
Source: see text 
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Lower priced BEV models 
 
The price of the specific plug-in models chosen for analysis did not change between 2017 and 
2020, after adjusting for inflation. However, the question that arises from the results of halving 
their initial purchase price, is whether there are any plug-in vehicles in the market that have a 
price which is around 50% of the prices of the cars modelled in this study for the small and 
large size categories, and would therefore comfortably break even with their petrol counterparts, 
just like the Nissan Leaf in the medium size category does. 
 
Concentrating on BEVs, which are zero emission, examples in the small size category include 
the Skoda CitiGoE and the Volkswagen e-up!, with price tags which are 56% and 65% that of 
the BMW i3, respectively. The Renault ZOE has an initial purchase price which is 81% that of 
the BMW i3. In the large size category, the Hyundai Kona Electric and the Kia e-Niro have 
purchase prices which are 41% and 49% that of the Tesla X, respectively, and the Audi e-tron 
Quattro has a purchase price which is 75% that of the Tesla X. 
 
Table B2 breaks down the prices of these BEVs and Table B3 shows the TCO ratios, with and 
without taxes and subsidies, with the petrol car as the reference. One important feature of the 
TCO ratios of these cars is that some of them are not far from reaching cost parity, even when 
taxes and subsidies are excluded from the calculations. The Skoda CitiGoE, in particular, has a 
TCO ratio of 0.99 under a 0% discount rate. 
 
For comparison purposes, the calculations are done including the 2017 subsidies, but also the 
reduced subsidies that came into effect in October 2018 and March 2020. As expected, the 
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lower the initial purchase price, and the higher the subsidy, the more likely these BEVs are to 
break even with the petrol reference in their size category. 
 
In addition, although not shown on the table, the breakeven point for those BEVs that have 
lower TCO than their petrol reference, occurs earlier in time when the subsidy is higher, and 
this is important for impatient consumers with high discount rates. 
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Table B2: Examples of lower priced BEV models available in 2020 
 Small BEVs Large BEVs 
Make and model Skoda CitiGoE Volkswagen e-UP Renault ZOE Hyundai Kona Electric Kia e-Niro Audi e-tron Quattro 
Base price £ (no tax) 15533 17946 22601 25321 30214 46454 
VAT 20% 3107 3589 4520 5064 6043 9291 
Price inc. VAT (£) 18640 21536 27121 30386 36257 55744 
Electricity consumption kWh/100km 14.8 14.5 17.3 15.0 15.9 24.4 
Source: Car prices and energy consumption from manufacturers’ websites (listed in Appendix A), except for Skoda CitiGoE, whose energy 
consumption was taken from Randall (2019). All monetary values expressed in 2017 prices. 
 
Table B3: Total Costs of Ownership ratios, with petrol car as the reference 
  No taxes or subsidies 2017 taxes and subsidies 2018 taxes and subsidies 2020 taxes and subsidies 
  0% 6% 30% 60% 0% 6% 30% 60% 0% 6% 30% 60% 0% 6% 30% 60% 
                  
Small 
Skoda CitiGoE 0.99 1.05 1.19 1.25 0.62 0.68 0.82 0.88 0.65 0.72 0.87 0.94 0.67 0.73 0.90 0.97 
Volkswagen e-UP 1.09 1.18 1.35 1.43 0.71 0.78 0.96 1.05 0.74 0.82 1.01 1.11 0.75 0.84 1.04 1.13 
Renault ZOE 1.34 1.45 1.69 1.78 0.90 1.00 1.26 1.38 0.93 1.04 1.31 1.43 0.94 1.06 1.33 1.46 
                  
Large 
Hyundai Kona Electric 1.17 1.25 1.40 1.46 0.83 0.90 1.10 1.18 0.84 0.93 1.13 1.21 0.85 0.94 1.15 1.23 
Kia e-Niro 1.36 1.46 1.66 1.73 0.98 1.08 1.34 1.44 0.99 1.11 1.36 1.47 1.00 1.12 1.38 1.49 
Audi e-tron Quattro 2.04 2.20 2.53 2.65 1.53 1.70 2.12 2.29 1.54 1.73 2.14 2.32 1.55 1.74 2.16 2.34 
Note: The reference for the small size category is the Ford Fiesta Turbo and the reference for large size category is the Nissan Qashqai dig 
Source: own calculations 
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Appendix C: Car comparisons 
 
In this appendix, we systematically compare the five specific cars modelled within each size 
category in relation to the following features: 
 
▪ Power in kW, which is the maximum power that the engine can put out; 
▪ Acceleration, expressed as the number of seconds it takes for the vehicle to go from 0 
to 100 km per hour; 
▪ Weight, expressed in kg; 
▪ Top speed, in km per hour; 
▪ Fuel consumption in litres per 100 km, and for vehicles that combine fossil fuels and 
electricity or run on electricity only, an ‘equivalent’ fuel consumption;14 
 
One additional feature we also use for a second set of comparisons is the purchase price 
including VAT. 
 
We follow Nieuwenhuis (2014) and produce spider webs for each car. There are, however, two 
problems with Nieuwenhuis’ graphs, as follows: (a) it is difficult to interpret them because 
some features, such as power, are desirable, whilst others, such as CO2 emissions, are not 
desirable, yet they are all measured with positive numbers on the spider web; and (b) the units 
are different throughout (grams per km is different from km per hour, etc). 
 
14 This number was taken from the manufacturer’s technical specifications for the Tesla X. The 
manufacturer’s technical specifications for the BMW i3 and the Leaf EV did not include any 
‘equivalent’ fuel consumption, so this was computed using the standard conversion formula to convert 
kWh/100 miles to miles per US gallon equivalent, MPGe = 3370,5 ÷ kWh/100 miles, and then converted 
to litres per 100 km. 
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We therefore adapt Nieuwenhuis’ method by first producing an index for each feature, defined 
as the actual value the feature takes for that particular car model, minus the minimum value the 
feature takes for that car category, all divided by the difference between the maximum and 
minimum values that the feature takes within that car category: 
 
𝐹𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 =
𝑎𝑐𝑡𝑢𝑎𝑙 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 − 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑚𝑢𝑚 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒
 
 
For the features which are not desirable, we compute 1 − 𝑓𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑥 . In this way, we 
solve the problem of units, and we make the indices comparable, as the most desirable values 
are those approaching 1. 
 
Tables C1 shows the values for each feature and Table C2 shows the indices. Figure C1 shows 
the spider webs for the 15 cars modelled in this study. 
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Table C1: Car features 
 
Vehicle size Small Medium Large 
Propulsion type Petrol Diesel HEV PHEV BEV Petrol Diesel HEV PHEV BEV Petrol Diesel HEVd PHEV BEV 
Make 
Ford Ford Toyota Mini BMW Ford VW Toyota BMW Nissan Nissan Nissan Toyota Mitsu-
bishi 
Tesla 
Model 
Fiesta 
Turbo 
Fiesta 
TDCi 
Yaris Coun-
tryman 
Cooper 
i3 Focus Golf 
TDi 
Auris 
Hybrid 
330e Leaf Qash-
qai 
DiG 
Qash-
qai 
dCi 
C-HR 
HEV 
Outla-
nder 
Model 
X 
Reference 
Fiesta 
petrol 
Fiesta 
diesel 
Yaris 
hybrid 
Mini 
PHEV 
i3 EV 
Focus 
petrol 
Golf 
diesel 
Auris 
Hybrid 
BMW 
PHEV 
Leaf 
EV  
Qash-
qai 
petrol 
Qash-
qai 
diesel 
C-HR 
Hybrid 
Outla-
nder 
PHEV 
Tesla 
EV 
                
Power in kW 63 85 74 165 75 74 85 73 185 110 85 81 90 89 245 
Acceleration (0-100 
kph in seconds)  
13.8 12.4 11.8 6.8 7.3 12.5 10.2 10.9 6.1 7.9 10.6 11.9 11 11 5.2 
Weight (kg) 1,113 1,191 1,127.5 1,635 1,270 1,313 1,301 1,310 1,769 1,530 1,331 1,393 1,380 1,860 2,352 
Top speed (km per 
hour) 
169 174 165 198 150 185 198 180 225 144 185 182 169 170 209 
Fuel consumption 
l/100km combined 
(for electric an 
equivalent is given) 
5.1 3.8 3.7 2.1 1.5 4.6 4.1 3.9 1.9 2.2 5.6 3.8 3.8 1.7 2.4 
CO2 emissions 
mixed g/km 
115 96 84 49 0 105 106 91 44 0 129 99 86 41 0 
Price inc. VAT (£) 13470 15590 15699 31000 33340 19915 19686 21615 35902 27237 19081 20871 23345 36702 73984 
 
Note: The Power in kW in the manufacturer’s specifications of the Mini Countryman Cooper and the BMW 330e is the sum of the power of the 
electric motor and that of the internal combustion engine. 
Source: Manufacturers’ websites and https://ev-database.uk/ 
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Table C2: Car feature indices 
 
Vehicle size Small Medium Large 
Propulsion type Petrol Diesel HEV PHEV BEV Petrol Diesel HEV PHEV BEV Petrol Diesel HEVd PHEV BEV 
Make 
Ford Ford Toyota Mini BMW Ford VW Toyota BMW Nissan Nissan Nissan Toyota Mitsu-
bishi 
Tesla 
Model 
Fiesta 
Turbo 
Fiesta 
TDCi 
Yaris Coun-
tryman 
Cooper 
i3 Focus Golf 
TDi 
Auris 
Hybrid 
330e Leaf Qash-
qai 
DiG 
Qash-
qai 
dCi 
C-HR 
HEV 
Outla-
nder 
Model 
X 
Reference 
Fiesta 
petrol 
Fiesta 
diesel 
Yaris 
hybrid 
Mini 
PHEV 
i3 EV 
Focus 
petrol 
Golf 
diesel 
Auris 
Hybrid 
BMW 
PHEV 
Leaf 
EV  
Qash-
qai 
petrol 
Qash-
qai 
diesel 
C-HR 
Hybrid 
Outla-
nder 
PHEV 
Tesla 
EV 
                
Power 0 0.22 0.11 1 0.12 0.01 0.11 0 1 0.33 0.02 0 0.05 0.05 1 
Acceleration 0 0.20 0.29 1 0.93 0 0.36 0.25 1 0.72 0.19 0 0.13 0.13 1 
Weight 1 0.85 0.97 0 0.70 0.97 1.00 0.98 0 0.51 1.00 0.94 0.95 0.48 0 
Top speed 0.40 0.50 0.31 1 0 0.51 0.67 0.44 1 0 0.40 0.33 0 0.03 1 
Fuel consumption 0 0.36 0.39 0.83 1 0 0.19 0.26 1 0.90 0 0.46 0.46 1 0.82 
CO2 emissions 
mixed 
0 0.17 0.27 0.57 1 0.01 0 0.14 0.58 1 0 0.23 0.33 0.68 1 
Price inc. VAT 1 0.89 0.89 0.12 0 0.99 1 0.88 0 0.53 1 0.97 0.92 0.68 0 
 
Source: Table C1 
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Figure C1: Spider webs for comparison of car features 
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Medium category 
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Large category 
  
 
Source: Table C1 
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What is crystal clear from all six graphs is that there is no single car that outperforms all others 
in terms of all features. A point worth noting, however, is that PHEVs and BEVs, which, 
unsurprisingly, have the best fuel economy and lowest CO2 emissions in each category, often 
score better than other cars in terms of power, or acceleration, or top speed, or even weight. 
There are always trade-offs and the final decision will depend on consumer’s preferences, and 
importantly, budget constraints. 
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